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Abstract
A sizeable literature suggests that financial sector development could be an
important enabler of the growth benefits of trade openness. We provide a com-
prehensive analysis of how financial development can affect the relationship be-
tween trade openness and growth using a dynamic panel threshold model and
an extensive dataset for a large sample of countries for the 1970-2015 period.
We find that there is a financial development threshold in which trade openness
has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. We also find that when
splitting the sample into industrialized and non-industrialized countries, the fi-
nancial development threshold that enables the growth benefits of trade is higher
in the former group of countries than in the latter. This finding is consistent with
the fact that the export composition of industrialized countries is tilted towards
more capital-intensive finance-constrained goods.
JEL Classification: F43, O41, C33
Key words: Trade openness, growth, threshold model, panel data.
∗We are grateful to Roberto Chang and Diego Winkelried as well as the participants of the Ninth
conference on Growth and Business Cycle in Theory and Practice (Manchester, United Kingdom); the
2018 Congress of the Peruvian Economic Association (Piura, Peru); the 2018 Annual Meeting of the
Economics Society of Chile (Valparaiso, Chile); the Global Research on Emerging Economies Confer-
ence (Lima, Peru), and the Universidad del Pac´ıfico Research Seminar for their valuable comments
and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors are ours.
Corresponding author: N.R. Ramı´rez-Ronda´n, Department of Economics, Universidad del Pac´ıfico.
Av. Salaverry 2020, Lima 11, Peru. E-mail address: nr.ramirezr@up.edu.pe.
1
1 Introduction
A key issue in economic growth is whether or not trade openness has significant growth
effects and how these effects are best enabled. In theory, there are many channels
through which trade openness can have positive effects on growth. For instance, it has
been argued that openness generates important gains from comparative advantage, dis-
seminates knowledge and technologies, facilitates technology transfer, increases mar-
ket size, and reduces rent-seeking activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Jones and
Romer, 2010; Young, 1991, among others). These effects should, in turn, be reflected in
stronger economic growth as resource allocation improves and the frontier of production
expands. Trade openness, however, could also be detrimental to growth, particularly
when a country specializes in extractive and non-innovative sectors (Matsuyama, 1992;
Chang et al., 2009, among others).
The empirical evidence of a strong and robust link between trade openness and
growth is, unsurprisingly, mixed. On the one hand, cross-country and panel data stud-
ies have found that trade has a positive effect on growth (Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1998;
Frankel and Romer, 1999; Lee et al., 2004; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008, among others).
Some of these studies, however, have been criticized for their use of faulty methodolo-
gies, inadequate trade openness measures, and lack of robust results (Rodr´ıguez and
Rodrik, 2001; Rodr´ıguez, 2007). On the other hand, other studies have reported ev-
idence that trade openness in itself might not be enough to deliver strong economic
growth and that the trade and growth relationship might even be nonlinear (Ulas¸an,
2015; Chang et al., 2009). Openness seems to be more effective when complemented
by competitiveness-boosting factors.
This latter result suggests that enabling the growth benefits of trade might require
the presence of certain institutions, which themselves are a source of comparative ad-
vantage (Nunn and Trefler, 2014). One such institution is financial markets. Financial
markets are key as they facilitate the interplay between saving and investment deci-
sions, and thus economic growth. These markets are, however, fraught with imperfec-
tions, asymmetric information, and other problems. The extent of these imperfections
affects economic outcomes. The development of financial markets and associated in-
stitutions would be reflected in better saving-investment allocation and better growth
performance (McKinnon, 1973; Levine, 2005).
The empirical literature has not conclusively established the existence of a robust
financial development and growth relationship. Several cross-country and panel data
studies have found that financial development has a positive effect on economic growth
(Levine et al., 2000; Levine, 2005, among others). However, more recent studies have
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uncovered vanishing (Rousseau and Watchel, 2011) and even detrimental growth effects
of excessive financial development (Arcand et al., 2015). This latter finding suggests
that some countries might have encouraged the development of excessively large fi-
nancial sectors. Other studies have used microdata to provide evidence that countries
with more developed financial sectors have higher production levels in the externally
financed sector (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
In this paper, we examine whether financial sector development affects the openness
and economic growth nexus. This is an extremely topical issue, especially given the
pushback against trade openness and the recent introduction of tariffs in some coun-
tries, which have made global trade relations increasingly problematic. In addition,
important questions about the soundness of developing large financial markets –and
the sense that there is too much finance in some countries– have been raised. While we
do not address these issues directly, we do examine how financial sector development
can strengthen the openness and growth relationship. Are there some threshold levels
of financial development that an economy needs to enable the growth benefits from
openness? Are these thresholds different across country groups?
There are many ways in which financial development could affect the trade openness
and growth nexus. First, financial development can itself be a source of comparative
advantage. More developed financial sectors tend to be of most benefit to those indus-
tries that require external financing in greater proportion, and affect a country’s trade
structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Beck, 2002, among
others). Beck (2002), for instance, reports evidence that countries with more developed
financial sectors have a comparative advantage in manufacturing, as the financing of
the considerable fixed costs faced by this sector is cheaper in such countries.
Second, financial development, insofar as it mitigates the distortive effects of fi-
nancial frictions, can positively affect productivity and tilt trade composition towards
capital-intensive industries. Thus, sectors vulnerable to financial frictions, like the
large-scale manufacturing sector, respond positively to the development of a country’s
financial markets (Buera et al., 2011). This could lead to a restructuring of a country’s
trade composition away from labor-intensive industries and towards capital-intensive
industries (Leibovici, 2018), including the large-scale manufacturing and high-tech sec-
tors. There is some evidence that a country’s export composition matters for economic
growth (Hausmann et al., 2007).
Third, as trade openness increases a country’s exposure to world market fluctua-
tions, a more developed financial system functions as an insurance mechanism against
external risks, facilitating greater trade openness (Kim et al., 2010). To the extent
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that asset markets allow for well-diversified incomes across a country’s population,
protectionist lobbying efforts would be reduced (Feeney and Hillman, 2004). Empirical
evidence about the complementarity between asset development and trade liberaliza-
tion is reported in Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002), and Feeney and Hillman (2004).
Fourth, the benefits of trade liberalization are often affected by the depth of a
country’s financial sector. This is the case because in a world with financial frictions
and shallow financial markets, credit constrained firms operate at sub-optimal levels
and are not able to take advantage of trade openness (Kohn et al., 2017). In this
situation, only the non-credit constrained firms would export, and the deepening of
financial markets would increase both the number of exporting firms and total exports
(Chaney, 2016).
In sum, we have discussed many channels through which financial sector develop-
ment could affect the trade openness and growth relationship. Most of these channels
are enablers of the growth benefits of international trade. They also explain differences
in export composition across countries and across time.
To examine how financial development affects the trade openness and growth rela-
tionship, we utilize a dynamic panel threshold model for a large sample of countries for
the period 1970-2015. This method allows us to separate the observations into discrete
groups based on their financial development, and then estimate the different growth ef-
fects of trade openness among these groups within a unified framework (Hansen, 1999,
2000; Ramı´rez-Ronda´n, 2015).
We find evidence of a single financial development threshold in which trade open-
ness has a positive and significant effect on growth. Importantly, this financial de-
velopment threshold (27.3 percent of GDP) is not especially high, and more than 70
percent of the countries in the sample exceeded it in 2011-15. When the sample is split
into industrialized and non-industrialized countries, we find that the financial develop-
ment threshold for the former (38.4 percent of GDP) is greater than that of the latter
(27.4 percent). This partly reflects differences in these countries’ trade composition,
as industrialized economies export more capital-intensive credit-dependent goods than
non-industrialized economies.
Our paper is related to Chang et al. (2009), who examine a set of wide-ranging
reforms, including in the financial sector, that could help a country benefit from trade
openness. Their findings, based on a dynamic panel model with interactions, suggest
that financial development has a positive and increasing effect on the trade and growth
relationship. These findings are at odds with the recent literature, which has reported
that financial development in excess of 80-100 percent of GDP is detrimental to growth
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(Arcand et al., 2015). In contrast, our use of a dynamic panel threshold model allows
us to identify a financial development threshold beyond which the trade and growth
relationship become significant. The estimated thresholds are well below the financial
sector levels deemed excessive. Moreover, when conducting a horse race between mod-
els, we find that the dynamic panel threshold model is superior to the dynamic panel
model with interactions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our em-
pirical methodology, including the specification of the model and estimation methods.
In Section 3 we present our main empirical results–testing for the existence of a thresh-
old, inference of the threshold estimate, regression results, and discussion. In Section
4 we present a battery of robustness tests on the threshold location, additional control
variables, and comparison with other nonlinear specifications. Finally, in Section 5 we
conclude.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Specification
The standard dynamic panel growth regression model takes the form
yit − yit−1 = µi + κyit−1 + βxit−1 + θ′Zit−1 + it, (1)
where yit is log of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, yit−yit−1 is the GDP
per capita growth rate; µi is an unobserved country-fixed effect; xit is a measure of trade
openness; Zit is a set of control variables; it is the error term; i indexes countries; and
t indexes time periods (quinquenniums). β, κ and θ are parameters to be estimated.
Note that yit−1 on the right hand side takes into account the transitional convergence
effect as predicted by the neoclassical growth theory, and is the dynamic feature of the
model.
In order to assess whether or not financial development affects the trade openness
and economic growth relationship, we estimate the following dynamic growth regression
with a threshold variable:
yit − yit−1 = µi + κyit−1 + β1xit−11(qit−1 ≤ γ) + β2xit−11(qit−1 > γ) + θ′Zit−1 + it, (2)
where qit is a country’s financial development level; and 1(.) is an indicator variable
which takes the value of 1 if financial development is greater than a threshold, and
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of 0 otherwise. γ is the financial development threshold parameter to be estimated.
In this specification the effects of trade openness on growth depend on the financial
development regime.
Note that qit−1, xit−1 and Zit−1 are lagged variables with respect to the dependent
variable, making them internal instruments. This is to avoid endogeneity problems that
arise from an existing correlation between either the control variables or the threshold
variable and the error term. Such problems are common in economic growth models,
since there is a contemporary double causality between growth and its determinants.
2.2 Control variables
Numerous economic and institutional variables can be posited as determinants of eco-
nomic growth. However, following the empirical economic growth review of Loayza
et al. (2005) and given data availability we consider the following growth determi-
nants: transitional convergence, structural policies, institutions, stabilization policies,
and external conditions (world trends).
First, the relationship between initial per capita GDP and growth rates is an im-
portant implication of the neoclassical growth theory; that is, a country´s growth per-
formance depends on its initial position. That literature states that, ceteris paribus,
backward countries with a low capital-output ratio may grow faster than rich ones due
to the decreasing return to factors of production. To control for this possibility, we
include the initial level of per capita GDP as one of the regressors.
Second, we include a country´s level of financial development as another regressor,
because it facilitates the saving and investment decisions. Financial markets also allows
for risk diversification through the negotiation of financial instruments that enable
identification of profitable investment projects and mobilize savings on them (Loayza
et al., 2005). We use the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP to measure the degree
of financial depth.
We also consider three other structural factors: (i) human capital plays a key role in
exploiting the inflow of technological knowledge and utilizing the new physical capital
ushered in by trade liberalization, so we use a human capital index from the Penn
World Table; (ii) public infrastructure affects growth by entering directly as produc-
tion function input, by improving total factor productivity, and by encouraging private
investment; and (iii) government efficiency and quality foster economic growth; Mauro
(1995) states that greater control of corruption increases economic growth, so we con-
sider an average of four indicators reported in the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) as a proxy for institutions.
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Lastly, stabilization policies contribute to economic growth, since they reduce uncer-
tainty, encourage firm investment and let economic agents focus on productive activities
(Loayza et al., 2005). For this reason, we use three variables as proxies of the stabi-
lization capability of countries: (i) price instability; (ii) output instability; and (iii)
the occurrence of systemic banking crises. In addition, we account for other global
conditions that could impact GDP growth by including time dummies or world GDP
growth in the estimation.
2.3 Data
Our period of study spans from 1970 to 2015 for a sample of 80 countries. Table 1 shows
constructions and definitions of the variables used in the estimation analysis, including
the trade openness measure to be used.1 Summary statistics of the variables involved
in the estimation analysis are given in Table 2, and Table 3 shows pairwise correlations
among the variables included in the estimation analysis; the initial GDP per capita
is highly correlated with the structural variables and institution, which reveals that
richer countries show better fundamentals.
2.4 Threshold regression model
Threshold regression models divide individual observations into classes based on the
value of an observed variable, and have been widely used in time series analysis. Hansen
(1999) extends these models to a balanced panel data context –mainly by introducing
econometric techniques using least squares (LS) estimation methods. As the growth
models are dynamic, we use the econometric techniques developed by Ramı´rez-Ronda´n
(2015), who proposes maximum likelihood (ML) estimation for a dynamic panel thresh-
old model using a first difference transformation. In this context, the first GDP per
capita of each quinquennium represents the transitional dynamics.
We divide the observations into two regimes depending on whether the threshold
variable qit is smaller or larger than the threshold parameter γ. The regimes are
distinguished by differing regression slopes, β1 and β2. For the identification of these
coefficients, the elements of qit−1 must not be time-invariant. The error it is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and finite variance.
1This structure-adjusted measure of trade intensity was proposed by Pritchett (1996) to avoid
attributing to trade policy what is merely the result of structural country characteristics, like area
or landlockedness, and has been widely used in the growth literature; see for example Blyde and
Ferna´ndez-Arias (2005), Loayza et al. (2005), Chang et al. (2009) or Aghion et al. (2009).
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Table 1: Variables
Variable Definition Source
GDP per capita growth Log difference of real GDP per capita. World Development
Indicators.
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total GDP to total
population. GDP is in 2010 US$. In logs.
World Development
Indicators.
Human capital Human capital index, based on years of
schooling and returns to education. In
logs.
Penn World Table.
Financial depth Ratio of domestic credit claims on private
sector to GDP. In logs.
World Development
Indicators.
Public infrastructure Fixed and mobile telephone lines per 100
habitants. In logs.
World Development
Indicators.
Institutions Average of four indicators: bureaucracy
quality, prevalence of law and order, ab-
sence of corruption, and accountability of
public officials.
International Coun-
try Risk Group
(ICRG).
Trade openness Residual of a regression of the log of the
ratio of exports and imports to GDP, on
the logs of area and population, and dum-
mies for oil exporting and for landlocked
countries.
World Development
Indicators, the
observatory of eco-
nomic complexity,
and CIA.
Price instability Deviation of annual % change in consumer
price index (CPI) from 4%.
World Development
Indicators.
Output instability Standard deviation of GDP per capita
growth.
World Development
Indicators.
Systemic banking crises Frequency of years under banking crisis. Chang et al. (2009)
and Laeven and Va-
lencia (2018).
External conditions World GDP per capita growth. World Development
Indicators.
The static and dynamic estimations of model (2) involves three steps: estimation,
inference and testing.
Threshold and slope estimations
In the static methodology, one can eliminate the country-specific effect by removing
country-specific means. Let ∆yit ≡ yit−yit−1, β′ = (β1, β2)′ and assuming for simplicity
that there are no control variables; thus, the within transformation of model (2) is
∆y+it = κy
+
it−1 + β
′x+it−1(γ) + 
+
it , (3)
where we define ∆y+it ≡ ∆yit − T−1
∑T
t=1 ∆yit, y
+
it−1 = yit−1 − T−1
∑T
t=1 yit−1, 
+
it ≡
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth per capita growth (%) 720 1.858 2.692 -10.457 15.839
Initial GDP per capita, in logs 720 8.375 1.545 5.431 11.561
Human capital, in logs 720 0.715 0.341 0.009 1.314
Financial depth, in logs 720 3.439 0.922 -0.192 5.396
Output instability 720 2.918 2.367 0.074 21.621
Institutions 720 3.520 1.446 0.5 6.0
Systemic banking crises 720 0.080 0.204 0.0 1.0
Public infrastructure, in logs 720 2.243 2.242 -3.416 5.295
Trade openness, in logs 720 0.044 0.440 -1.410 1.504
External conditions (%) 720 1.528 0.490 0.606 2.081
Price instability, in logs 720 2.594 0.898 0.013 8.783
Table 3: Correlations
Variable GDP growth Initial GDP Human Financial Output
per capita per capita capital depth instability
Initial GDP per capita 0.060
Human capital 0.156 0.829
Financial depth 0.212 0.706 0.658
Output instability -0.253 -0.198 -0.360 -0.269
Institutions 0.163 0.790 0.710 0.659 -0.289
Systemic banking crises -0.295 0.060 0.051 0.017 0.112
Fixed and mobile lines 0.191 0.724 0.814 0.617 -0.361
Trade openness 0.188 0.159 0.230 0.267 -0.065
World GDP growth 0.163 -0.022 -0.052 -0.031 0.010
Price instability -0.259 -0.232 -0.250 -0.423 0.252
Variable Institutions Systemic Public Trade World
banking crises infrastructure openness GDP growth
Systemic banking crises 0.029
Fixed and mobile lines 0.592 -0.025
Trade openness 0.129 -0.045 0.323
World GDP growth -0.020 -0.189 -0.041 -0.025
Price instability -0.310 0.180 -0.367 -0.353 -0.096
it − T−1
∑T
t=1 it and
x+it−1(γ) ≡
(
xit−11(qit ≤ γ)− 1T
∑T
t=1 xit−11(qit ≤ γ)
xit−11(qit > γ)− 1T
∑T
t=1 xit−11(qit > γ)
)
.
For any given γ, the slope coefficients κ and β can be estimated by ordinary least
squares (LS), and then the regression residuals are
̂+it(γ) = ∆y
+
it − κ̂y+it−1 − β̂(γ)′x+it−1(γ), (4)
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and the sum of squared errors to be minimized is
S(γ) =
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
̂+it(γ)
2. (5)
The criterion function (5) is not smooth, so conventional gradient algorithms are
not suitable for its minimization. Hansen (1999, 2000) recommends estimation of the
threshold by using a grid search over the threshold variable space. That is, construct an
evenly spaced grid on the empirical support of the threshold variable qit, and minimizes
the concentrated sum of squared errors (5). Finally, once γ̂ is obtained, the slope
coefficient estimate is β̂ = β̂(γ̂); and note that β̂(γ̂) = (β̂1(γ̂), β̂2(γ̂))
′.
As regards the dynamic methodology, we cannot consider a fixed effects transfor-
mation for the dynamic threshold model since it could introduce a correlation between
the transformed regressors and the transformed error term in the model, thus leading
to inconsistency of the slope parameter. This is addressed by taking a first difference
transformation of model (2) to eliminate the individual specific effect. We then have:
yit − yit−1 − (yit−1 − yit−2) = κ(yit−1 − yit−2) + β1(xit−11(qit−1 ≤ γ)−
xit−21(qit−2 ≤ γ)) + β2(xit−11(qit−1 > γ)− xit−21(qit−2 > γ)) + it − it−1. (6)
Let ∆2yit ≡ yit−yit−1−(yit−1−yit−2), ∆yit−1 ≡ yit−1−yit−2, ∆x∗it−1 ≡ xit−11(qit−1 ≤
γ) − xit−21(qit−2 ≤ γ), ∆x+it−1 ≡ xit−11(qit−1 > γ) − xit−21(qit−2 > γ), and ∆it ≡
it − it−1, then equation (6) becomes:
∆2yit = κ∆yit−1 + β1∆x∗it−1(γ) + β2∆x
+
it−1(γ) + ∆it. (7)
The ML estimation of the dynamic panel linear model depends on the initial con-
dition, which is key to establishing the consistency of the estimates (see Hsiao et al.,
2002). Thus, by assuming that the process has started from a finite period in the past,
such that the expected changes in the initial endowments are the same across all indi-
viduals, that model specification in the first period is given by ∆2yi1 = δ+vi1, were δ is
an auxiliary external parameter. Further, we assume exogeneity of xit−1, homoscedas-
ticity across regimes, and by construction, E(vi1|xi) = 0, where xi = (xi0, xi1, ..., xiT )′,
and Ev2i1 = σ
2
v .
Let ∆2yi = (∆
2yi1,∆
2yi2, ...,∆
2yiT )
′ and ∆i = (vi1,∆i2, ...,∆iT )′, and also define
ω = σ2v/σ
2
 . Thus, under the assumption that it is independent normal, the joint
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probability distribution function of ∆2yi is equivalent to (in logarithm):
lnL(δ, β, κ, γ, σ2 , ω) = −
nT
2
ln(2pi)− n
2
ln|Ω| − 1
2
n∑
i=1
∆(δ, β, κ, γ)′Ω−1(δ, β, κ, γ), (8)
where Ω is defined in Hsiao et al. (2002). The criterion function (8) is well defined,
and depends on a fixed number of parameters. Then, the ML estimators of δ̂, β̂, κ̂, γ̂,
σ̂2 and ω̂ are the values that maximize lnL(δ, β, κ, γ, σ
2
 , ω).
Hence, the algorithm for estimation has the following procedure:2 (i) for a given
value of γ on the grid of the threshold variable, the criterion (8) is smooth; so we
can calculate δ̂(γ), β̂(γ), κ̂(γ), σ̂2 (γ) and ω̂(γ) by maximizing that function; (ii) by
plugging those previous estimates in (8), it only depends on γ; and since the function
is not smooth in γ, we find γ̂ on the grid of the threshold variable which yields the
highest value of the likelihood function; and finally, we set β̂1 = β̂1(γ̂) and β̂2 = β̂2(γ̂).
Asymptotic confidence intervals
When there is a threshold effect (β1 6= β2), Hansen (2000) has shown that threshold
estimate, γ̂, is consistent for γ0 (the true value of γ) and that the asymptotic distri-
bution is non standard. Hansen (1999) argues that the best ways to form confidence
intervals for the threshold is to form the no rejection region using the likelihood ratio
statistic for test on γ̂. To test hypothesis H0: γ = γ0, the likelihood ratio test is to
reject for large values of LR(γ0) where
LR(γ) = n(T − 1)S(γ)− S(γ̂)
S(γ̂)
, (9)
where S(γ) is defined in (5) in the static methodology, while in the dynamic case
S(γ) =
∑n
i=1 ∆̂i(γ)
′Ω−1∆̂i(γ) is the minimum distance estimator, which converges in
distribution as n → ∞ to a random variable ξ with distribution function P (ξ ≤ z) =
(1− exp(−z/2))2.
Then, the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic is non-standard,
yet free of nuisance parameters (Hansen, 2000). Since the asymptotic distribution is
pivotal, we use it to form valid asymptotic confidence intervals. Furthermore, the
distribution function ξ has the inverse
c(α) = −2ln(1−√1− α), (10)
2For further details on the estimation see Ramı´rez-Ronda´n (2015).
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where α is the significance level. The “no-rejection region” of confidence level 1− α is
the set of values of γ such that LR(γ) ≤ c(α). This is easiest to find by plotting LR(γ)
against γ and drawing a flat line at c(α).
Test for existence of threshold effects
It is important to determinate whether the threshold effect is statistically significant.
The hypothesis of no threshold effects in (2) can be represented by the linear constraint
H0 : β1 = β2. Under the null hypothesis, H0, the threshold γ is not identified, so
classical tests have non-standard distributions. Hansen (2000) suggested a bootstrap to
simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio test for this kind of models,
so that the p-values constructed from the bootstrap procedure are asymptotically valid.
Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the model (1) without control variables
is
∆yit = µi + κyit−1 + β1xit−1 + it, (11)
after the within and first difference transformations are made in order to eliminate µi,
we get
∆y+it = κy
+
it−1 + β1x
+
it−1 + 
+
it , (12)
and
∆2yit = κ∆yit−1 + β1∆xit−1 + ∆it, (13)
where x+it−1 ≡ xit−1 − T−1
∑T
t=1 xit−1 and ∆xit−1 = xit−1 − xit−2. The parameter β1 is
estimated by LS or ML, yielding estimates β̂1, residuals ̂it and let S0 =
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 ̂
+2
it
the sum of squared residuals and S0 =
∑n
i=1 ∆̂
′
itΩ
−1∆̂it the minimum distance esti-
mator of the linear model in the static and dynamic methodologies, respectively. The
likelihood ratio test of H0 is based on
F = n(T − 1)S0 − S(γ̂)
S(γ̂)
; (14)
thus, the null hypothesis is rejected if the percentage of draws for which the simulated
statistic exceeds the actual value is less than some critical value.
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3 Estimation and inference results
3.1 Linear model results
Table 4 provides the results of a linear model with two estimation methodologies. In
the full sample, trade openness has a significant positive effect on growth under the
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, but not under the least squares (LS) estimation.
Although the effect on economic growth seems to be inconclusive, when we split the
sample into industrialized and non-industrialized countries we find that this positive
and highly strong effect only occurs in industrialized countries, and that there are no
effects in non-industrialized countries in either estimator.
As suggested by the theory, trade openness seems to have a differentiated effect on
economic growth. We also find that financial development plays an enabling role on
that effect –and indeed, we find that it consistently has a statistically significant effect
on growth across estimators and samples. While there is no evidence that financial de-
velopment has a direct effect on growth, it has an important indirect effect throughout
trade openness.
3.2 Threshold effects
The first step is to test for the existence of a threshold effect in the relationship between
GDP growth and trade openness using the F test of equation (14). This also involves
estimating equation (2) and computing the residual sum of squares for the financial
depth threshold. We conduct the test for the existence of threshold effects using a
sample of 80 countries over nine five-year average periods between 1970 and 2015.3
The test for existence of threshold effects is shown in Table 5. The null hypothesis
of no threshold effect against single threshold can be rejected at least at the 95 per
cent significance level. The test statistics F for the single threshold are 23.057 and
18.711 with their corresponding bootstrap p-value of 0.005 and 0.042 for the static and
dynamic methodologies, respectively. This indicates that the test for a single threshold
is highly significant;4 thus, we conclude that there is strong evidence for threshold
effects of financial depth in the trade and growth relationship.
3These are the results when considering the full sample. The rejection of the null hypothesis also
holds when considering other sub samples and different sets of control variables.
4We also perform a test in which we allow two thresholds, but we find that the test is not statistically
significant.
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Table 4: Estimation results of the linear model
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Full sample Industrialized countries Non-industrialized countries
LS ML LS ML LS ML
Trade openness 0.622 1.371 4.056 3.475 0.437 0.757
Structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs (0.459) (0.386) (0.893) (0.781) (0.529) (0.433)
[0.528] [0.466] [0.753] [0.961] [0.570] [0.568]
Financial depth -0.217 -0.460 -0.163 -0.071 -0.03 -0.120
Domestic credit to private sector/GDP, in logs (0.257) (0.225) (0.356) (0.295) (0.315) (0.267)
[0.251] [0.216] [0.299] [0.344] [0.290] [0.260]
Transitional convergence -4.628 -3.817 -4.184 -2.701 -4.547 -4.009
Initial GDP per capita, in logs (0.492) (0.391) (1.020) (0.903) (0.576) (0.443)
[0.616] [0.411] [1.250] [0.863] [0.678] [0.550]
Human capital 1.173 0.705 -5.689 -9.381 1.580 1.550
Index based on schooling and returns, in logs (1.494) (1.234) (3.982) (3.381) (1.694) (1.326)
[1.429] [1.293] [4.489] [3.70] [1.473] [1.40]
Public infrastructure 0.704 0.488 -0.730 -0.868 0.730 0.559
Fixed and mobile lines per 100 people, in logs (0.173) (0.117) (0.535) (0.462) (0.195) (0.125)
[0.167] [0.095] [0.517] [0.278] [0.173] [0.108]
Institutions 0.532 0.607 1.046 0.984 0.402 0.466
Average of 4 ICRG indicators (0.190) (0.168) (0.363) (0.321) (0.224) (0.186)
[0.176] [0.174] [0.399] [0.360] [0.193] [0.185]
Output instability 0.098 0.079 -0.053 -0.123 0.082 0.079
Std. Dev of GDP per capita growth (0.044) (0.041) (0.107) (0.082) (0.051) (0.045)
[0.046] [0.065] [0.107] [0.107] [0.048] [0.067]
Price instability -0.290 -0.261 -2.066 -2.021 -0.191 -0.223
CPI growth (0.143) (0.131) (0.396) (0.366) (0.164) (0.142)
[0.155] [0.155] [0.360] [0.590] [0.158] [0.156]
Systemic banking crises 0.053 -0.133 0.932 0.553 0.109 0.177
Frequency of years under crisis: 0-1 (0.471) (0.415) (0.581) (0.454) (0.578) (0.519)
[0.389] [0.492] [0.402] [0.718] [0.447] [0.578]
External conditions -0.321 -0.302 -1.188 -1.255 0.027 0.048
World GDP growth (0.164) (0.155) (0.176) (0.164) (0.213) (0.189)
[0.144] [0.218] [0.164] [0.336] [0.183] [0.233]
Number of countries 80 80 21 21 59 59
Number of periods, five year average 9 9 9 9 9 9
Time period 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015
R-squared 0.242 - 0.602 - 0.231 -
Negative log-likelihood - 1403 - 236 - 1015
Notes: LS stands for (ordinary) least squares, and ML stands for maximum likelihood. Homoscedastic and heteroskedastic standard
errors in parentheses and brackets, respectively.
3.3 Threshold estimate and its confidence interval
The second step is to compute the confidence intervals. The point estimate of the
threshold and their asymptotic 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals are reported
in Table 6. The two categories of countries and periods indicated by the point estimate
are those with “low financial depth” and “high financial depth”. Moreover, the asymp-
totic confidence intervals for the threshold are very tight, indicating low uncertainty
regarding the nature of this division.
More information about the estimated threshold can be obtained by plotting the
concentrated likelihood ratio function LR(γ) of the estimate (see Figure 1). This
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Table 5: Tests for threshold effects
Threshold Test Bootstrap Critical
estimate (%) F p-value values
Static methodology 27.429 23.057 0.005 13.7081/
15.6582/
21.3063/
Dynamic methodology 27.338 18.711 0.042 13.8021/
17.5572/
24.8163/
Note: 1/, 2/ and 3/ critical values at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We
used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test.
Table 6: Asymptotic confidence interval in threshold model
Threshold 90% confidence interval 95% confidence interval 99% confidence interval
Static
27.429 [26.306 ; 28.516] [26.193 ; 28.516] [25.939 ; 29.720]
methodology
Dynamic
27.338 [26.183 ; 28.507] [25.924 ; 29.457] [22.925 ; 29.720]
methodology
function is minimized at zero in the estimated threshold γ̂ = 27.429 and γ̂ = 27.338,
corresponding to the static and dynamic methodologies with high precision and little
uncertainty, since the confidence interval, the set of values below the dotted line, is
very small.
Figure 1: Confidence interval construction for threshold
(a) LS estimation (a) ML estimation
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3.4 Slope estimation results
When considering a threshold model for the full sample (see Table 7) the effect of trade
openness on growth becomes differentiated between two regimes: countries with “low
financial depth” –less than 27%– gain nothing from trade openness, while those with
“high financial depth” benefit greatly from increased openness.5 Therefore, it can be
concluded that there are two country regimes, and that trade openness has a different
effect on growth for each according to financial depth level. The empirical literature
supports these findings, as a poor level of financial development would not let domestic
firms and economic sectors with scale economies to benefit from the potential lower
costs and higher returns on capital, thus slowing development and growth. Conversely,
greater financial depth level boosts economic growth.
To be sure, the marginal effect should not be the same for countries with different
income levels and institutional quality. Table 7 also shows the results obtained for
industrialized and non-industrialized countries.6 The results show that the estimated
threshold around 38% domestic credit to the financial sector is considerably higher than
that for non-industrialized countries (27%). But even though the level of financial
development required for commercial openness to have a positive impact on growth
is higher for industrialized countries, the marginal effect of trade on growth is also
higher when the financial threshold is actually met: the elasticity for non-industrialized
countries ranges from 2.7 to 2.8, while in industrialized countries it ranges from 4.4 to
4.8.
One might wonder whether the effect of openness when crossing the threshold in
the case of industrialized countries is the same as in the case of non-industrialized
countries; thus, we test the significance of the difference between the coefficients.7
The resulting range of the p-values of this test goes from 0.091 for the LS estimation
to 0.095 for the ML estimation; the test favors the alternative hypothesis that the
difference in the effects is statistically significant at a p-value less than 0.10. As to the
null equality hypothesis of the thresholds of the industrialized and non-industrialized
countries, we cannot apply an analogous test since the threshold parameter estimates
do not converge to a normal distribution –but it might be expected that such estimates
5Note that the null hypothesis of a linear model is rejected in all cases.
6See Appendix A for the classification based on United Nations.
7As such coefficients come from different independent samples and regressions, we use the follow-
ing Z test, following the approach of Clogg et al. (1995): Z = (β̂2,Ind − β̂2,Nonind)/(SE(β̂2,Ind)2 +
SE(β̂2,Nonind))
0.5, where β̂2,Ind and β̂2,Nonind are the coefficients of trade openness once the threshold
is met for the industrialized and non-industrialized countries, respectively; and SE stands for the stan-
dard error in Table 7; and the test follows a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis
of equality of the two coefficients.
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Table 7: Estimation results of the threshold model
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Full sample Industrialized countries Non-industrialized countries
LS ML LS ML LS ML
Financial depth threshold estimate (γ̂) 27.429 27.338 38.666 38.413 27.429 27.429
[90% Confidence Interval] [26.3 ; 28.5] [26.2 ; 28.3] [35.2 ; 47.8] [35.3 ; 46.4] [26.3 ; 28.4] [26.4 ; 28.8]
Trade openness (Financial depth < γ̂) -0.253 0.519 1.910 1.057 -0.369 -0.044
Structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs (0.493) (0.424) (0.907) (0.955) (0.555) (0.460)
[0.541] [0.468] [0.995] [1.255] [0.561] [0.539]
Trade openness (Financial depth ≥ γ̂) 2.590 3.026 4.822 4.354 2.817 2.710
Structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs (0.635) (0.518) (0.893) (0.776) (0.783) (0.606)
[0.713] [0.615] [0.758] [0.995] [0.872] [0.860]
Financial depth -0.203 -0.449 -0.088 0.065 -0.014 -0.085
Domestic credit to private sector/GDP, in logs (0.252) (0.222) (0.344) (0.284) (0.308) (0.262)
[0.245] [0.219] [0.286] [0.306] [0.285] [0.267]
Transitional convergence -5.275 -4.423 -4.732 -3.402 -5.235 -4.739
Initial GDP per capita, in logs (0.504) (0.408) (0.996) (0.879) (0.589) (0.464)
[0.579] [0.447] [1.172] [0.862] [0.621] [0.560]
Human capital 1.220 0.530 -4.66 -8.365 1.661 1.362
Index based on schooling and returns, in logs (1.466) (1.216) (3.846) (3.237) (1.658) (1.299)
[1.393] [1.224] [4.075] [3.181] [1.434] [1.316]
Public infrastructure 0.684 0.514 -0.938 -1.092 0.70 0.590
Fixed and mobile lines per 100 people, in logs (0.170) (0.115) (0.519) (0.444) (0.191) (0.122)
[0.163] [0.091] [0.499] [0.321] [0.168] [0.103]
Institutions 0.627 0.696 1.235 1.227 0.478 0.542
Average of 4 ICRG indicators (0.188) (0.166) (0.355) (0.312) (0.220) (0.183)
[0.170] [0.170] [0.374] [0.421] [0.184] [0.178]
Output instability 0.094 0.072 -0.073 -0.144 0.076 0.077
Std. Dev of GDP per capita growth (0.044) (0.040) (0.103) (0.078) (0.049) (0.044)
[0.046] [0.064] [0.098] [0.098] [0.048] [0.065]
Price instability -0.349 -0.297 -2.322 -2.335 -0.264 -0.278
CPI growth (0.141) (0.129) (0.389) (0.358) (0.161) (0.140)
[0.147] [0.151] [0.366] [0.648] [0.149] [0.150]
Systemic banking crises -0.016 -0.269 0.999 0.594 -0.012 0.076
Frequency of years under crisis: 0-1 (0.462) (0.410) (0.560) (0.433) (0.566) (0.508)
[0.397] [0.504] [0.393] [0.710] [0.457] [0.590]
External conditions -0.361 -0.343 -1.14 -1.202 -0.028 -0.002
World GDP growth (0.161) (0.153) (0.170) (0.158) (0.208) (0.186)
[0.142] [0.211] [0.155] [0.335] [0.180] [0.223]
Test for threshold effects (p-value) 0.005 0.042 0.060 0.095 0.010 0.018
Number of countries 80 80 21 21 59 59
Number of periods, five year average 9 9 9 9 9 9
Time period 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015
R-squared 0.272 - 0.635 - 0.266 -
Negative log-likelihood - 1393 - 228 - 1003
Notes: LS stands for (ordinary) least squares, and ML stands for maximum likelihood. Homoscedastic and heteroskedastic standard errors
in parentheses and brackets, respectively. The test shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of β̂1 = β̂2. We used 1000 bootstrap
replications for the test.
are in fact different, since the confidence intervals of each do not overlap under any of
the LS and ML estimations.
Industrialized countries need a more developed financial system because of their
trade composition. While non-industrialized countries have a higher share of agri-
cultural materials, raw materials, and raw minerals and generally specialize in low-
technology industries, industrialized countries instead have a substantially higher ex-
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port share of manufactured, high technology, and information and communication
technology goods and services. Such sophisticated products –which include aerospace
products, ICT goods and services, scientific products and instruments, and electrical
machinery– have high capital, technology and R&D intensity.
Goods with a high level of sophistication require more technology and financial
instruments to meet the needs of a more demanding industry; indeed, industrialized
countries have better financial characteristics than non-industrialized ones in terms
of financial institutions (depth, access, efficiency and stability) and financial markets
(stock market capitalization, stock market turnover ratio, etc.). And industrialized
countries are also associated with better developed infrastructure, higher human capital
indexes, and higher quality institutions, making them well-suited to the production of
technology-intensive goods.
3.5 Countries in each regime
The percentage of countries corresponding to low financial depth regime in the last
quinquennium of the analysis is 30%, as shown in Table 8, indicating that with im-
provements in their financial sector, these countries can take advantage of interna-
tional specialization. It should be noted that the classifications of countries in Table
8 are based on the dynamic methodology; the classifications with the static methodol-
ogy estimates are the same, since the threshold estimates are rather similar for both
methodologies.
Nevertheless, throughout the period of 1970-2015, the evolution in the level of fi-
nancial development has not been the same across all countries: 31.3% remained in the
regime of “high” financial depth, 20% stagnated in the “low” regime, and almost all
the remaining countries enhanced their financial systems, with six exceptions –Algeria,
Argentina, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela– originally
positioned in the “good” regime by their private credit levels, which have since de-
creased to the extent that they have not been able to reach the required threshold level
for the last 10 or 15 years at least.
These countries have been characterized by political instability, high export vulner-
ability, dependence on oil exports, or even deep economic recessions. Thus, important
preconditions for financial development to flourish –such as a robust institutional con-
text or even trade openness, sufficient bureaucratic quality, and law and order– were
absent (Chinn and Ito, 2006).
The fact is that while the financial development level of all industrialized countries
has been far beyond its threshold for the last 15 years, in the case of non-industrialized
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Table 8: Percentage of countries in each regime by quinquennium
Full sample
Regime 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011-
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Financial depth < 27.338% 57.5% 47.5% 41.3% 46.3% 55.0% 46.3% 43.8% 41.3% 30.0%
Financial depth ≥ 27.338% 42.5% 52.5% 58.8% 53.8% 45.0% 53.8% 56.3% 58.8% 70.0%
Industrialized countries
Regime 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011-
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Financial depth < 38.413% 42.9% 33.3% 33.3% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Financial depth ≥ 38.413% 57.1% 66.7% 66.7% 90.5% 90.5% 90.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Non-industrialized countries
Regime 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011-
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Financial depth < 27.429% 74.6% 59.3% 54.2% 62.7% 74.6% 62.7% 59.3% 55.9% 40.7%
Financial depth ≥ 27.429% 25.4% 40.7% 45.8% 37.3% 25.4% 37.3% 40.7% 44.1% 59.3%
Non-industrialized countries under the industrialized threshold
Regime 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011-
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Financial depth < 38.413% 89.8% 79.7% 72.9% 76.3% 76.3% 71.2% 74.6% 67.8% 62.7%
Financial depth ≥ 38.413% 10.2% 20.3% 27.1% 23.7% 23.7% 28.8% 25.4% 32.2% 37.3%
countries, 40.7% of the countries still linger in the regime in which trade openness has
a null marginal effect on economic growth (see Table 8). Furthermore, looking at the
industrialized countries’ threshold for financial development, it can be seen that 60%
of the countries do not comply with this requirement as of the last quinquennium in
the sample.
3.6 Control variables results
Moving on to control variables, the initial GDP per capita was significant and negative
as the neoclassic model predicts. Financial depth as a control variable is not significant,
while institutions have a positive effect on GDP growth: a higher institutional quality
of government increases GDP growth.8 Human capital has no additional statistically
significant effect on economic growth, and public infrastructure, as measured by fixed
and mobile telephones per 100 habitants, has a positive and statistically significant
impact on growth.9
8Similarly, Mauro (1995) finds that improving the control of corruption index in a standard devi-
ation would make the annual growth rate rise by 1.3%.
9Note that human capital and public infrastructure have negative effects in the industrialized
countries; these unexpected results can be due to the few countries in the subsample, which makes
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Controls for stabilization policies in the estimation are output instability, price in-
stability, and the frequency of systemic banking crises. Inflation has a negative and
significant impact on GDP growth. This leads to the conclusion that higher macroe-
conomic instability (approximated by the inflation rate) has a negative effect on the
per capita GDP growth rate. Price instability negatively affected growth mainly in
the 1980s, during which many countries recorded their highest levels of inflation. As a
consequence, this period, characterized by high price instability leading to a reduced
output growth rate, was known as “the lost decade”.
In the same way, the occurrence of banking crises may be detrimental to GDP
growth. The indicator used states that a country is in crisis when significant signs of
financial distress in the banking system (major bank runs, losses in the banking sys-
tem, and/or bank liquidations); and if there are significant banking policy intervention
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system (Laeven and Valencia,
2018), the effect on output growth is not significant. Similarly, the five-year average of
output instability has no effect on long-term growth.
Finally, the world GDP growth variable as a control of external conditions in the
estimation, incorporated as the five-year average of aggregate world GDP growth,
has an overall negative impact on economies. The effects are higher in industrialized
countries, while there are no effects in non-industrialized ones.
4 Robustness
4.1 Threshold location
Even though the estimated threshold remains robust across methodologies in each
subsample, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the threshold estimate; to this end,
we estimate the threshold considering a leave-one-out, leave-two-out, and leave-three-
out sample. We then analyze how many times these estimates fall within the 90%
confidence interval of each sample estimation. This rules out the possibility of outliers
in the sample, and evaluates the robustness of our estimates. The results of these tests
indicate that the estimated threshold is robust to the changes in the sample, as none
of the sub-sample estimates falls out of the confidence interval (see Table 9).
the slope results quite sensitive.
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Table 9: Robustness of the threshold estimate
% of threshold estimates that fall in 90% confidence interval
Full Industrialized Non-industrialized
sample countries countries
Static methodology
Leave one country out 100% 100% 100%
Leave two countries out 100% 94% 100%
Leave three countries out 100% 89% 100%
Dynamic methodology
Leave one country out 100% 95% 100%
Leave two countries out 100% 88% 100%
Leave three countries out 100% 79% 99%
Note: for the leave two and three countries out tests, we used 200 draws from all
possible combinations in each sample.
4.2 Additional control variables
Several other control variables are considered in the empirical economic growth lit-
erature; thus, in addition to the baseline specification in Table 10, we also employ
the investment to GDP ratio and population growth as additional control variables.
These variables also serve as a source of growth through capital and labor in a growth
accounting exercise.
In regard to external conditions, the measurement variables used in the literature
are international interest rates, international movement in capital flows, oil prices,
commodity prices, global uncertainty, among others; in order to capture those external
condition movements over the time period, we include time dummy variables instead
of world GDP growth.
Table 7 shows the results by including more control variables and, overall, the finan-
cial depth threshold estimate and slope trade openness effects are quite robust. Finally,
we include other country control variables like terrestrial precipitation, the Chinn-Ito
index of financial openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), and the debt to GDP ratio; but
apart from reducing our availability of countries in the sample, such variables turn out
to be non-significant in the regressions, so we decided not to include in the robustness
exercise.
4.3 Comparison with other nonlinear models
Table 11 provides the results of a linear model with an interaction between financial
development and trade openness, like that employed in Chang et al. (2009), and Zghidi
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and Abida (2014). These results suggest that the effect of trade openness on growth is
different for different values of financial depth, while the unique effect of trade openness
is not significant. We can again see a differentiated marginal effect of trade openness
on growth when we split the full sample into two sub samples (industrialized and
non-industrialized countries).
Table 11: Estimation results of the interaction model
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Full sample Industrialized countries Non-industrialized countries
LS ML LS ML LS ML
Trade openness -1.635 -0.495 -2.390 -5.991 -1.850 -1.276
Structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs (1.008) (0.852) (3.096) (2.550) (1.166) (0.969)
[1.016] [0.799] [2.970] [3.688] [1.081] [0.992]
Trade openness*financial depth 0.787 0.625 1.465 2.159 0.839 0.717
(0.314) (0.255) (0.675) (0.556) (0.382) (0.306)
[0.297] [0.226] [0.621] [0.798] [0.355] [0.325]
Financial depth -0.143 -0.414 -0.197 -0.091 0.066 -0.034
Domestic credit to private sector/GDP, in logs (0.257) (0.225) (0.351) (0.283) (0.317) (0.268)
[0.255] [0.220] [0.295] [0.317] [0.299] [0.268]
Transitional convergence -5.127 -4.208 -4.426 -3.252 -5.093 -4.506
Initial GDP per capita, in logs (0.528) (0.421) (1.010) (0.876) (0.625) (0.489)
[0.614] [0.442] [1.185] [0.696] [0.674] [0.581]
Human capital 1.305 0.638 -5.679 -8.661 1.737 1.499
Index based on schooling and returns, in logs (1.487) (1.228) (3.920) (3.244) (1.687) (1.318)
[1.401] [1.267] [4.494] [3.187] [1.444] [1.369]
Public infrastructure 0.678 0.498 -0.702 -0.884 0.699 0.569
Fixed and mobile lines per 100 people, in logs (0.173) (0.116) (0.527) (0.442) (0.195) (0.124)
[0.164] [0.094] [0.518] [0.312] [0.169] [0.108]
Institutions 0.609 0.673 1.132 1.106 0.470 0.524
Average of 4 ICRG indicators (0.192) (0.169) (0.360) (0.309) (0.225) (0.187)
[0.178] [0.178] [0.386] [0.370] [0.194] [0.187]
Output instability 0.086 0.067 -0.097 -0.195 0.067 0.067
Std. Dev of GDP per capita growth (0.044) (0.041) (0.107) (0.080) (0.051) (0.045)
[0.047] [0.065] [0.101] [0.095] [0.049] [0.067]
Price instability -0.326 -0.281 -2.210 -2.251 -0.224 -0.246
CPI growth (0.143) (0.130) (0.395) (0.356) (0.164) (0.142)
[0.154] [0.157] [0.364] [0.603] [0.156] [0.157]
Systemic banking crises 0.006 -0.213 1.047 0.649 0.014 0.102
Frequency of years under crisis: 0-1 (0.468) (0.414) (0.575) (0.435) (0.577) (0.517)
[0.392] [0.501] [0.411] [0.704] [0.451] [0.582]
External conditions -0.318 -0.304 -1.216 -1.285 0.033 0.050
World GDP growth (0.163) (0.154) (0.173) (0.158) (0.211) (0.188)
[0.143] [0.217] [0.162] [0.347] [0.182] [0.231]
Number of countries 80 80 21 21 59 59
Number of periods, five year average 9 9 9 9 9 9
Time period 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015 1971-2015
R-squared 0.252 - 0.618 - 0.241 -
Negative log-likelihood - 1400 - 229 - 1012
Notes: LS stands for (ordinary) least squares, and ML stands for maximum likelihood. Homoscedastic and heteroskedastic standard errors
in parentheses and brackets, respectively.
The panel model with interactions provides further evidence about the nonlinear
trade-growth relationship, which varies with a country’s level of financial development.
That is, the panel model with interacions does not identify a financial development
threshold beyond which the trade and growth relationship become significant. In ad-
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dition, both the R-squared and the negative log-likelihood favor the threshold model
against the interaction model; that is, the threshold model fits the data better than
the interaction model in the full, industrialized, and non-industrialized samples.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the implications of financial sector development for the
trade openness and growth nexus. We find that financial sector development, from a
clearly identifiable threshold, is a key enabler of the growth benefits of trade. This
finding is consistent with the recent literature suggesting that the indirect effects of
financial development on growth might be as strong as the direct effects, and that these
effects are concentrated on trade. We find that these results are robust to changes in
specification and to the sequential elimination of three countries from the sample at
a time. This finding provides evidence that financial sector development is itself a
source of comparative advantage. The use of a dynamic panel regression is justified
as it allows us to clearly identify the financial sector development threshold within a
tractable framework.
We also find that the financial-sector-threshold enablers of growth benefits from
trade are greater for industrialized than for non-industrialized economies. This is
consistent with the literature’s conjecture that countries that export more capital-
intensive and finance-dependent sectors need deeper financial sectors. Importantly, the
financial development thresholds we estimate are much lower than the 80-100 percent of
GDP thresholds found to be detrimental to economic growth elsewhere in the literature.
Furthermore, industrialized economies also gain considerably more once their threshold
is met.
Future work should look more closely at the trade composition of trade openness
measures and the comparative advantage effects of financial development, given the
growing evidence that both the levels and composition of international trade are im-
portant for growth. Moreover, an understanding of the extent to which domestic firms
are liquidity constrained will be key for any assessment of the benefits and poten-
tial of trade openness. The assessment of financial sectors as a source of economic
growth needs to recognize that this sector in itself represents a source of comparative
advantage.
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A Classification of countries
Table 12: Classification of countries
Industrialized countries Non-industrialized countries
Australia Algeria Ghana Paraguay
Austria Argentina Guatemala Peru
Belgium Bangladesh Honduras Philippines
Canada Bolivia India Senegal
Denmark Botswana Indonesia Sierra Leone
Finland Brazil Iran, Islamic Rep. Singapore
France Burkina Faso Israel South Africa
Germany Cameroon Jamaica Sri Lanka
Greece Chile Kenya Sudan
Iceland China Korea, Rep. Thailand
Ireland Colombia Madagascar Togo
Italy Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Japan Congo, Rep. Malaysia Tunisia
Luxembourg Costa Rica Mali Turkey
Netherlands Cote d’Ivoire Mexico Uruguay
Norway Dominican Republic Morocco Venezuela
Portugal Ecuador Nicaragua Zambia
Spain Egypt, Arab Rep. Niger
Sweden El Salvador Nigeria
United Kingdom Gabon Pakistan
United States Gambia, The Panama
Source: United Nations.
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